this potential bioweapon, one being the United States. Yet, in accord with the WHO resolution, the majority of the US population by this time had no immunity to smallpox. By then, Henderson had returned to the United States as a senior academic and later became adviser to President George H. W. Bush. Regrettably, here he is the epitome of discretion. He names few people, but does reveal his experience of the chilling intransigence and medical ignorance shown by the Pentagon in its negotiations with him over biological warfare policies.
Like 'high reliability' . The former states that some accidents are unavoidable in complex systems that are tightly coupled, such as nuclear power stations. Unexpected interactions among such a system's components can escalate a small problem into a major failure more quickly than human operators can respond. Thus a tension arises between the need for both centralized control, to ensure safe operations, and decentralized authority, to generate creative solutions to unexpected problems. These two goals conflict; yet society requires that complex systems such as airtraffic control operate safely. With great effort this can be achieved and centralization and decentralization can coexist; these are called high-reliability organizations. High-reliability organizations seem ideal for managing a space mission. Their organization is hierarchical and centralized for routine decision-making. But when systems are stressed, other modes come into play. Cooperative relations emerge between front-line practitioners and senior officials; ranks fade as everyone focuses on fixing the problem and ensuring the mission's success. The organization responds to emergency situations that threaten major system failure with pre-planned procedures that are rehearsed and updated. Thus high-reliability organizations are highly self-conscious about learning, in order to respond to unexpected, non-routine events.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA adopt elements of high-reliability theory, although it observed that "neither High Reliability Theory nor Normal Accident Theory is entirely appropriate". But the histories of Challenger and Columbia show that NASA has not fully integrated learning into its organization. After Challenger, there was a greater willingness to communicate problems up the management chain and clear lines of authority and accountability were created. But they blurred over the years as a result of budgetary and organizational turmoil.
Only minor errors of interpretation or omission creep in to Mahler's analysis. For example, the congressional direction to use commercial software -when no suitable product existed -isn't mentioned in her discussion of NASA's difficulty in implementing a financial reporting system for project managers. This omission could lead readers to conclude that difficulties were solely due to NASA's shortcomings. But imposed requirements also contributed to decisions made. 
